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Drawing on research on subjective confidence, we examined how the confidence and 
speed in responding to personality items track the consistency and variability in the 
response to the same items over repeated administrations. Participants (N = 57) responded 
to 132 personality items with a true/false response format. The items were presented five 
times over the course of two sessions. Consistent with the Self-Consistency Model, the 
confidence and speed with which an item was endorsed at its first presentation predicted 
the likelihood of repeating that response across the subsequent presentations of the item, 
thus tracking test-retest reliability. Confidence and speed also predicted the likelihood 
that others will make the same response, thus tracking inter-person consensus. However, 
confidence and speed varied more strongly with within-person consistency than with 
inter-person consensus, suggesting some reliance on idiosyncratic cues in response 
formation. These results mirror, in part, findings obtained in other domains such as general 
knowledge, social attitudes, and personal preferences, suggesting some similarity in the 
decision processes underlying the response to binary items: responses to personality 
items are not retrieved ready-made from memory but constructed at the time of testing, 
based on the sampling of a small number of cues from a larger population of cues 
associated with the item’s content. Because confidence is based on the consistency with 
which the cues support a response, it is prognostic of within-person consistency and 
cross-person consensus. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed.
Keywords: self-report measures of personality, consistency and variability, subjective confidence, State-Trait 
debate, response latency
INTRODUCTION
This article concerns the consistency and variability in people’s responses to self-report tests 
that are routinely used in the assessment of personality. The question of the stability in people’s 
responses and behavior has been the subject of heated debates for many years. The assessment 
of personality in terms of traits assumes that individual differences in the patterns of behavior 
associated with these traits are relatively stable across situations. This assumption has been 
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challenged by evidence suggesting that the cross-situational 
consistency in behavior is low or moderate at best (May and 
Hartshorne, 1926; Mischel, 1968). At the same time, however, 
there is evidence that individual differences in the expressions 
of trait-related behavior are stable across time (e.g., Fleeson, 
2004), and that trait measures predict many real-life variables 
(e.g., Paunonen, 2003).
In recent years, there has been increased effort to integrate 
between-person stability and within-person variability in an 
integrated conceptual framework (see Beckmann and Wood, 
2017). Researchers proposed that the notion of traits needs 
to be  modified to incorporate within-person variability. 
Fleeson (2001, 2004; see also Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 
2015) argued that traits should be  viewed as density 
distributions that represent how a person acts on different 
occasions. These distributions were obtained using an 
experience-sampling method in which participants reported 
on their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors on multiple occasions 
over time. Sun and Vazire (2019), who also used an experience-
sampling methodology, reported results suggesting that people 
are aware of the fluctuations in personality that occur across 
different daily occasions. They showed that for some 
personality traits, peoples’ perceptions of their momentary 
states correlate with those of external observers, suggesting 
that people have insight into the fluctuations in 
their personality.
In turn, Baumeister and Tice (1988; see also Bem and 
Allen, 1974; Tellegen, 1988) proposed that traits should 
be  conceived in analogy to attitudes. In the same way that 
not every person has an attitude about every issue, not all 
trait dimensions apply equally well to all people. Traits are 
said to constrain the behavior of traited persons, whereas 
untraited persons may take a broader range of trait-relevant 
actions. Therefore, focusing on traited individuals has the 
potential of increasing the consistency and predictive validity 
of measured traits (Kenrick and Stringfield, 1980).
Other researchers argued that within-person variability in 
trait levels is of interest in its own right. Fiske and Rice (1955) 
and Fleeson (2001) reported evidence suggesting that intra-
individual response variability is reliably stable across time 
(see also Baird et  al., 2006; Ferrando, 2011; Fleeson and 
Jayawickreme, 2015). Markus (1977), who focused on self-
concept, argued that a well-articulated self-schema is essential 
for consistency in endorsements of personality items, and for 
observing a relationship between an individual’s responses to 
these items and his or her other judgments and actions.
The approach that we took in this study is different. We used 
several self-report scales that are intended to measure individual 
differences in personality traits. Focusing narrowly on the test-
taking situation, we  examined the consistency and variability 
in participants’ responses to these test items. We took advantage 
of a conceptualization that proved useful in tracking both the 
stable and variable contributions to the measurement of social 
beliefs and social attitudes (Koriat and Adiv, 2011, 2012; Koriat 
et  al., 2016, 2018). Here, we  wish to examine whether this 
general conceptualization can also apply to the assessment of 
personality traits.
Underlying this conceptualization is the assumption that 
when assessing personality traits on the basis of self-report 
responses, the participants themselves play a critical role as 
measurement instruments. Consider a participant who is presented 
with the following items: “I enjoy intellectual challenges”; “When 
I  am  confused about an important issue, I  feel very upset.” 
What runs through the person’s mind in trying to decide 
whether to respond yes or no to these items? Possibly, the 
person recollects specific personal episodes, tries to recall what 
others think about him, compares himself to others, and so 
on (see Petty et  al., 2007). Thus, even though the items involve 
one’s self-perception, people do not usually retrieve a ready-
made response, but construct their response on the spot depending 
on the cues that are accessed at the time of responding. Indeed, 
proponents of the attitude-as-construction position have proposed 
that judgments about social attitudes are constructed online 
on the basis of the information accessible when making the 
judgment (Schwarz and Strack, 1985; Wilson and Hodges, 1992; 
Schwarz, 2007). A similar view was proposed with regard to 
people’s preferences (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006): it was argued 
that preferences are generally constructed in the process of 
elicitation. These views have emphasized the malleability and 
context-sensitivity of the responses to attitude and preference 
questions. We argue that the analysis of the cognitive processes 
involved in constructing a response to self-report measures of 
personality is of interest in its own right, and can also provide 
insight into the malleability inherent in the very assessment 
of personality traits. That analysis may also lead to a 
conceptualization in which response variability is conceived as 
an inherent property that must be  taken into account in the 
assessment of personality (see Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 2015; 
DeMarree and Bobrowski, 2018).
Previous work, based on the Self-Consistency Model (Koriat, 
2012), indicated that when people face two-alternative forced-
choice (2AFC) items, the confidence and speed with which 
they endorse their response provide insight into the psychological 
processes underlying that response (Koriat, 2008, 2012). In 
particular, confidence and response speed can help track the 
consistency and variability in people’s responses to the same 
items. Results consistent with this assumption have been obtained 
for tasks tapping general knowledge and perceptual judgments. 
In this study, we  examine whether this is also true for the 
responses to self-descriptive statements that are typically used 
in personality tests.
In what follows, we  first review the Self-Consistency Model 
and the findings that support it and then apply the model to 
people’s responses to items that measure individual differences 
in personality.
Choosing a Response to 2AFC Items: The 
Sampling Model
The Self-Consistency Model addresses the general question of 
how people choose between two options when they are presented 
with 2AFC items. In line with previous suggestions 
(Schwarz and Strack, 1985; Schwarz, 2007), it assumes that 
participants make their choice on the spot on the basis of a 
small number of cues that they retrieve. Specifically, they draw 
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a sample of cues sequentially from a population of cues that 
is associated with that item, and evaluate the implication of 
each cue for the decision. The retrieval of cues is terminated 
either when a predetermined number of cues has been accessed 
or when several cues in a row have been found to favor the 
same decision (Audley, 1960). Once the retrieval of cues has 
terminated, the choice of a response is based on the balance 
of evidence in favor of the two alternative responses (see 
Vickers, 2001), and confidence is based on the consistency 
with which the response chosen is supported across the cues 
retrieved. Thus, subjective confidence is assumed to capture 
the reliability of the decision: it reflects essentially the assessed 
likelihood of making the same response in subsequent encounters 
with the item.
This rudimentary model (for details on the model and its 
relationship to other models, see Koriat, 2012) makes several 
predictions that have been largely confirmed across several 
different tasks (see Koriat and Adiv, 2016). We  will review 
these predictions and findings and then examine their 
implications for the consistency and variability in the response 
to self-report measures of personality.
Within-Individual Analyses
Consider the situation in which the same set of 2AFC 
questions is presented on different occasions. Some variability 
in the responses may be  observed across different occasions 
(see Fiske and Rice, 1955), but confidence and response 
latency should be expected to track that variability. Specifically, 
the Self-Consistency Model predicts that participants should 
endorse their more frequent choice with greater confidence 
and speed than their less frequent choice (Koriat, 2012). 
For instance, a person who responds seven times to the 
item “Which sport activity would you  prefer, (a) jogging, 
(b) swimming?” should be  more confident in her frequent 
response (i.e., the response she chooses four times or more) 
than in her rare response (i.e., the response she chooses 
three times or less). In addition, the difference in confidence 
between participants’ more frequent and less frequent choices 
should increase with item consistency – the proportion of 
times that a more frequent response has been chosen across 
presentations. This means that a person’s confidence difference 
should be  larger for items where she chooses her frequent 
response six times and her rare response once (high item 
consistency) than for items where she chooses her frequent 
response four times and her rare response three times (low 
item consistency). These predictions are based on the sampling 
assumption underlying the Self-Consistency Model: people 
sample their cues largely from the same pool of cues across 
occasions, although the specific set of cues retrieved may 
differ from one occasion to another. However, the choices 
that are associated with higher confidence are the more 
representative of the population of cues associated with 
the item.
These predictions have been confirmed in seven experiments 
in which participants were repeatedly presented with the same 
task (see Koriat et al., 2016). The tasks used included perceptual 
judgments, like-dislike judgments, social beliefs, social attitudes, 
and personal preferences, all involving 2AFC responses. For 
each task, the two responses to each item were classified for 
each participant as frequent or rare according to their relative 
frequencies across presentations. Consistency was defined for 
each item as the number of times the more frequent response 
was endorsed across presentations (between five and seven 
presentations depending on the experiment). All experiments 
yielded a pattern in which (a) mean confidence was higher 
for the frequently chosen response than for the rare response 
and (b) the frequent-rare difference in confidence tended to 
increase with cross-presentation consistency. The same general 
pattern was observed for response speed (see Figure  3  in 
Koriat et  al., 2016). These results are consistent with the 
assumption that for each person, the aggregation of judgments 
across presentations discloses the characteristics of the item-
specific population of cues from which the individual draws 
a sample of cues in each occasion (Koriat, 2012). These 
characteristics are largely responsible for the consistency in 
people’s responses to each item across occasions (Fleeson, 
2004). Inconsistency stems from the fact that cognitive 
limitations constrain the number of cues that can be retrieved 
and consulted in each occasion, and that the response is 
based on the set of cues that are sampled at the time of 
making a judgment.
A second prediction follows from the assumption that 
confidence monitors the reliability of the response: confidence 
should be  diagnostic of the replicability of the response across 
item repetitions. Indeed, in experiments in which the same 
task was repeated several times, the confidence and response 
speed with which a response was made in the first presentation 
of an item were found to predict the likelihood of making the 
same response in the subsequent presentations. This was true 
for perceptual judgments, social beliefs, social attitudes, personal 
preferences, and category membership decisions (Koriat, 2011, 
2013; Koriat and Adiv, 2011, 2012; Koriat and Sorka, 2015).
These results bring to the fore the importance of considering 
both the stable and variable components in the assessment of 
self-report responses in many domains. Confidence and speed 
can help track the contributions of these components.
Cross-Person Analyses: The Prototypical 
Majority Effect
Other predictions of the Self-Consistency Model concern 
cross-person consensus. An important assumption of the 
model is that in many domains, such as general knowledge, 
perceptual judgments, and social beliefs, people with the same 
experience largely share the item-specific population of cues 
from which they draw their sample in each occasion. This 
assumption is consistent with research on the wisdom of 
crowds, although that research has focused on tasks for which 
the response has a truth value (Surowiecki, 2004). The 
predictions from this assumption are referred to as the 
prototypical majority effect (PME, see Koriat et  al., 2016, 
2018): first, for each 2AFC item, the response made by the 
majority of participants should be  endorsed with greater 
confidence, and shorter response latency than the minority 
response. Second, the majority-minority difference in confidence 
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and response speed should increase as a function of the size 
of the majority – the proportion of participants who opt for 
the majority choice. This pattern of results is precisely what 
was found in research on social conformity (e.g., Festinger, 
1954; Bassili, 2003; Petrocelli et  al., 2007). However, Koriat 
et  al. (2016, 2018) presented evidence that the PME pattern 
can occur independent of any social influence. Evidence for 
the predicted PME pattern was found for a number of domains, 
as reviewed by Koriat et  al. (2016).
It should be  stressed that the PME was observed both 
between-individuals and within-individuals: for each item, 
participants who chose the majority option tended to respond 
faster and with greater confidence than participants who chose 
the minority option. In addition, each individual tended to 
respond faster and with greater confidence when he/she chose 
the majority response than when he/she chose the minority 
response. The results of Koriat et  al. (2018) further suggest 
that people are likely to opt for the majority choice and to 
endorse it with greater speed and confidence even when they 
have no idea what other people choose, and even when they 
are wrong in predicting the majority response.
The Consensuality Principle: Some 
Constraints
The assumption that people with the same experience sample 
their cues largely from the same population of cues helped 
explain what was referred to as the consensuality principle 
(Koriat, 2008, 2011): confidence is correlated with the 
consensuality of the response – the likelihood that the same 
response will be  made by the majority of other participants. 
Thus, for tasks for which the response has a truth value, 
confidence monitors the accuracy of the choice only because 
the consensual response tends to be  the correct response. 
However, when consensuality and accuracy were disentangled 
by deliberately selecting items for which people tend to choose 
the wrong answer, the confidence-accuracy correlation was 
negative: wrong responses were endorsed with higher confidence 
than correct responses (Koriat, 2012, 2018). This was found 
to be the case across some 20 different tasks (see Koriat, 2018). 
In fact, confidence in the correctness of a response is more 
predictive of whether that response will be made by the majority 
of other participants than whether that response is correct or 
wrong (Koriat, 2019).
The consensuality principle is tenable for such domains as 
general knowledge and perceptual judgments because for these 
domains, people with similar experiences may be  expected to 
share the same population of cues for each item by virtue of 
their adaptation to the same ecology (Juslin, 1994; 
Dhami et  al., 2004). However, what happens in domains such 
as personality, for which stable differences exist between 
individuals? In these domains, we must assume that participants 
differ in the cues available to them and in the implications that 
they draw from these cues. Possibly, for such domains, confidence 
and response speed may prove to correlate more strongly with 
within-person consistency than with cross-person agreement. 
Indeed, such was found to be the case for social attitudes (Koriat 
and Adiv, 2011), social beliefs (Koriat and Adiv, 2012), and 
even more so for personal preferences (Koriat, 2013): when 
participants indicated their confidence in their response to a 
personal preference question (e.g., “do you  prefer to use a pen 
or a pencil?”), confidence in the choice was predicted better 
from within-person agreement than from cross-person consensus: 
the partial η2, as an estimate of effect size, was 0.89 for within-
person agreement, but only 0.14 for cross-person consensus.
This Study
Because the processes underlying confidence judgments have 
been most extensively studied with 2AFC items, it is useful 
to rely on this format in a first exploration of the applicability 
of the Self-Consistency Model to responses to personality items. 
Many prominent personality tests, including the MMPI 
(Dahlstrom et al., 1972) and CPI (Gough, 1987), were developed 
with a 2AFC format, although other popular personality 
inventories (e.g., the Big Five measures) employ a graded 
response format. Accordingly, our participants made a true/
false response to each 2AFC item and indicated their confidence 
in their response. Response latencies were also measured. Our 
intention was to see whether confidence and response speed 
provide insight into the process underlying the choice of a 
true/false response to self-descriptive items. Of key interest is 
whether confidence and response speed track the consistency 
and variability in people’s responses, similar to what had been 
found for items in other domains. To examine the predictions 
for within-person consistency, participants were presented with 
the same self-report questions five times.
In the within-individual analysis, we examined the prediction 
that the frequently made responses across repetitions should 
be  associated with higher confidence and speed than the less 
frequently made responses. Results consistent with this prediction 
would suggest that responses to self-descriptive personality 
questions are also constructed on the spot on the basis of the 
cues that are sampled at the time of judgment. We also examined 
whether confidence and response speed monitor the replicability 
of responses: we  tested the hypothesis that confidence in the 
first response to an item should predict the likelihood of repeating 
that response in the subsequent presentations of that item.
Turning next to cross-person consensus, the obvious 
prediction is that because of the idiosyncratic nature of the 
response to self-descriptive items, little relationship should 
be  found between confidence and consensus. Two somewhat 
surprising observations, however, suggest that such might 
not be the case. First, the predictions concerning the relationship 
between social consensus and confidence were confirmed even 
for personal preferences (Koriat, 2013). Despite the idiosyncratic 
nature of everyday personal preferences, confidence and 
response speed yielded a clear PME, suggesting that the cues 
underlying choice and confidence are partly shared across 
people. A second observation comes from the study of social 
attitudes (Koriat and Adiv, 2011). The items used in that 
study measured roughly conservatism-liberalism views. When 
participants were divided into “conservatives” and “liberals,” 
both groups yielded a PME even when the responses were 
defined as majority or minority responses on the basis of 
the entire sample of participants. Clearly, participants at the 
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opposite poles of an attitude dimension must sample their 
cues from overlapping but distinct distributions of cues, 
because otherwise they would not differ in their attitudinal 
judgments. Nevertheless, the results suggested that the cues 
shared across all participants contributed to people’s confidence 
in their choices.
Is it possible that even in the case of self-descriptive personality 
items, individuals draw on cues that are partly shared across 
people? If so, we  should expect some evidence for a PME: 
confidence in a response should increase with the proportion 
of other participants who make that response.
Altogether, the approach underlying the present study is 
that even in the case of self-descriptions, people do not 
retrieve a ready-made response, but reach a decision on the 
basis of the cues that they access at the time of making the 
judgment (see also Baumeister and Tice, 1988). Therefore, 
the constructive, inferential process may yield some 
variability in the response across occasions, but confidence 
and response speed should track both the stability and 
variability across occasions.
In the study to be reported, we used four personality scales. 
Two scales have been assumed to correlate with the tendency 
to yield to conformity pressures. The other scales are generally 
unrelated to conformity. In order to test the predictions from 
the Self-Consistency Model, we  used a 2AFC format for all 
items, and participants reported their confidence in the 
chosen response.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The study received the approval of the University of Southern 
California University Park Institutional Review Board. All 
participants provided informed consent.
Materials
The task included a total of 132 2AFC items from the following 
scales: (1) Social Desirability (SD). The SD scale of Crowne 
and Marlowe (1960) was used. It included 33 items. (2) Fear 
of Negative Evaluation (FNE). This scale was developed by 
Watson and Friend (1969). Here we used a brief version, which 
included 12 items (Leary, 1983). (3) Need for Closure (NFC). 
This scale (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994) included 47 items. 
(4) Rational-Experiential Inventory (RE) (Pacini and Epstein, 
1999). The scale included 40 items. A true/false format was 
used for all the scales.
Participants
Fifty-seven participants were recruited from the University of 
Southern California campus. They were asked to participate 
in a study on social beliefs and attitudes. After completing 
the two experimental sessions, they were paid $30.
Procedure
The study consisted of five presentations (blocks) of the entire 
set of 132 items. These presentations were divided between 
two sessions so that Session 1 included two blocks, and 
Session 2 included three blocks. In each block, all items were 
administered. The two sessions took place on two separate 
days at least 2  days apart, and lasted about 1  h (Session 1) 
and 1–1.5  h (Session 2).
Participants were instructed to read statements concerning 
personal attitudes and traits, and to decide whether each 
statement was true or false as it pertains to them personally. 
They were instructed to click with the mouse the True or 
False boxes that appeared beneath each statement, and then 
to indicate their confidence on a scale from 0 to 100%; 0 
means that they were completely unsure about their response, 
whereas 100 means that they felt absolutely confident about 
their response.
In each trial, each statement (e.g., “I hate to change my 
plans at the last minute”) was presented until participants 
pressed a continue box to indicate that they had finished reading 
it, at which time the response options true/false were added 
beneath the statement. Participants clicked one of the two 
response options. Response latency was measured, defined as 
the interval between the continue and the choice of a response. 
After clicking a confirm box, a confidence scale (0–100) was 
added beneath the alternative options, and participants marked 
their confidence by sliding a pointer on a slider using the 
mouse (a number in the range 0–100 corresponding to the 
location of the pointer on the slider was shown in a box). 
After clicking a second confirm box, the next trial began. 
Participants could change their response or their confidence 
judgment but not after clicking confirm.
The order of the items was random for each participant 
and block except that two practice items (different from one 
block to another) appeared at the beginning of each block. 
At the beginning of Blocks 2–5, participants were told that 
they would see the same items again, and that they should 
perform the same tasks on these items, as before.
RESULTS
In what follows, we  first use the results across the five blocks 
to examine the predictions regarding the relationship between 
confidence and within-person consistency. We  then turn to 
the effects of cross-person consensus, which will be  examined 
using the results from Block 1 only.
Our primary method of analysis was Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling (HLM). This method has several advantages over 
repeated measures ANOVA because it includes the 
simultaneous estimation of within-subject and between-
subjects variance (e.g., Quené and van den Bergh, 2004). 
Models were fit using the R packages lme4 and lmerTest 
(Bates et  al., 2015; Kuznetsova et  al., 2016). In all models, 
random intercepts for participants and items were specified. 
All categorical predictors were effect coded and all continuous 
predictors were centered at their mean. We  report 
unstandardized regression coefficients. Specifying random 
intercepts for participants took into account that people 
differ reliably with respect to mean confidence judgments 
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(Stankov and Crawford, 1997; Kleitman and Stankov, 2001). 
Thus, all results reported below were independent of people’s 
overall level of confidence.
Within-Person Analyses
In general, participants tended to give the same response 
consistently throughout the five blocks, supporting within-person 
stability (see Fleeson, 2004). The likelihood of choosing the 
Block-1 response over the next four blocks averaged 0.83 across 
all participants.
Confidence as a Function of Response 
Consistency
For each participant, we  classified all items into those that 
elicited the same response across all blocks (full consistency) 
and those exhibiting some degree of inconsistency (partial 
consistency). Confidence was significantly higher for the full-
consistency items (M = 78.33, SD = 10.42) than for the partial-
consistency items (M  =  65.39, SD  =  14.73), t(56)  =  13.44, 
p  <  0.0001, and d  =  1.80. All 57 participants exhibited higher 
confidence for the full-consistency items than for the partial-
consistency items, p  <  0.0001, by a binomial test.
The previous analysis involved between-item effects on 
confidence. We turn next to between-response effects, comparing 
confidence for the participant’s frequent and rare responses. 
Figure  1 presents mean confidence for the two categories of 
items as a function of item consistency – the number of times 
that the frequent response was chosen across the five 
presentations. The figure also includes mean confidence for 
the full-consistency items. As expected, an HLM that predicted 
confidence from item consistency (ranging from 3 to 5) revealed 
that confidence increased with item consistency, b  =  7.39 
(SE  =  0.15), t(37465)  =  48.14, and p  <  0.0001.
However, focusing on the partial-consistency items, confidence 
was significantly higher for the participants’ frequent responses 
(M = 67.74, SD = 14.78) than for the participants’ rare responses 
(M  =  58.14, SD  =  15.37), t(56)  =  11.57, p  <  0.0001, and 
d  =  1.55. All participants exhibited the pattern of higher 
confidence for frequent than for rare responses, p  <  0.0001, 
by a binomial test. Thus, participants were less confident when 
their response deviated from their own modal response. This 
pattern replicates results obtained for several other domains 
(Koriat et al., 2016) and is consistent with the Self-Consistency 
Model (Koriat, 2012).
As expected, the difference in confidence between the frequent 
and rare responses increased with item consistency. An HLM 
that predicted confidence from item consistency, response 
frequency (effect coded: −1  =  rare, 1  =  frequent), and their 
interaction yielded a main effect of response frequency, b = 10.22 
(SE  =  0.57), t(11197)  =  17.82, and p  <  0.0001, indicating 
higher confidence in frequent responses. A small but significant 
main effect of item consistency, b  =  −1.28 (SE  =  0.49), 
t(11148)  =  2.62, and p  =  0.009, indicated that confidence 
decreased slightly with item consistency. However, the interaction 
was significant, b  =  5.21 (SE  =  0.47), t(11197)  =  10.99, and 
p < 0.0001, indicating that the difference in confidence between 
the frequent and rare responses increased with item consistency. 
This pattern too replicates the pattern obtained for other tasks 
(Koriat et  al., 2016).
Response Latency as a Function of Response 
Consistency
We turn next to the results for response latency. In all analyses 
of response latency, latencies below or above 2.5 SDs from 
each participant’s mean in each block were eliminated (3.14% 
for Block 1 and 2.99% across all five blocks)1. Consistent with 
previous results (Kelley and Lindsay, 1993; Koriat et  al., 2006; 
Koriat, 2012), there was an inverse relationship between 
confidence and response latency. Thus, focusing on the results 
of Block 1, an HLM that predicted confidence from response 
latency indicated that confidence decreased significantly with 
response latency, b  =  −1.75 (SE  =  0.12), t(7282)  =  14.34, and 
p  <  0.0001.
1 None of our conclusions changed when analyzing log-transformed response 
latencies.
FIGURE 1 | Mean confidence judgments (top panel) and response latency 
(bottom panel) for the frequent and rare responses as a function of item 
consistency – the number of times that the response was made across all 
five blocks.
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We examined the results for response speed using the same 
analysis as we  did for confidence. The results, presented in 
Figure 1, largely mimic those for confidence. Response latency 
was significantly shorter for the full-consistency items 
(M  =  2.88  s, SD  =  0.74) than for the partial-consistency items 
(M  =  3.33  s, SD  =  0.90), t(56)  =  12.34, p  <  0.0001, and 
d = 1.65. This pattern was observed for 56 of the 57 participants, 
p  <  0.0001, by a binomial test.
Focusing now on the partial-consistency items, an HLM 
predicted response latency from item consistency, response 
frequency, and their interaction. A main effect of response 
frequency, b = −0.18 (SE = 0.06), t(10710) = 3.04, and p = 0.002, 
indicated that response latency was shorter by 176  ms for the 
frequent responses than for the rare responses. However, neither 
the main effect of item consistency, t  <  1, nor the interaction 
were significant, b  =  −0.06 (SE  =  0.05), t(10710)  =  1.20, 
p  =  0.228. Thus, the difference in response latency between 
frequent and rare responses did not increase significantly with 
item consistency.
In sum, it is impressive that despite the high stability in 
participant’s responses across repetitions, the results yielded 
the typical pattern of higher confidence for the frequent than 
for the rare responses. For confidence, the difference between 
frequent and rare responses increased with item consistency.
Replicability of the Response as a Function of 
Confidence and Response Speed
Assuming that confidence and response speed monitor the 
reliability of the response, we would expect that the confidence 
and speed with which a response is endorsed in Block 1 should 
predict the likelihood of making that response in the subsequent 
presentations of the item. Figure  2A shows the likelihood of 
repeating the Block-1 response across the subsequent four 
blocks. For ease of exposition, the means are plotted separately 
for six categories of confidence judgments in Block 1. A logistic 
HLM showed that the likelihood of repeating the Block-1 
response increased with people’s confidence in their Block-1 
response, b  =  0.03, z  =  32.99, and p  <  0.0001.
A similar pattern was observed for response latency 
(Figure  2B). The likelihood of repeating the Block-1 response 
across the subsequent blocks decreased significantly with people’s 
response latency in Block 1, b = −0.13, z = 16.46, and p < 0.0001. 
Thus, although participant exhibited some variability in their 
responses from one occasion to another, confidence and speed 
track the consistency of making the same response 
across occasions.
Cross-Person Analyses
The results for the within-person consistency replicated closely 
those obtained for other tasks. However, we  suspected that 
cross-person analyses may produce different results. The PME 
obtained so far was explained in terms of the assumption that 
populations of cues associated with a 2AFC question overlap 
in people with similar backgrounds. This assumption is less 
tenable for personality measures. We  now examine the effects 
of cross-person consensus on confidence and response speed 
focusing only on the results from Block 1. We first determined 
the consensual response to each of the 132 items. Item consensus 
for each item was defined as the percentage of participants 
who chose the consensual response. It averaged 71.88% across 
items (range: 50.88–98.25%).
Confidence as a Function of Cross-Person 
Consensus
For ease of exposition, Figure  3A presents mean confidence 
judgments for consensual and nonconsensual responses for 
each of six item consensus categories (51–59, 60–69, 70–79, 
80–89, 90–99, and 100%). Somewhat surprisingly, the results 
yielded a PME pattern similar to that found for other tasks 
such as general knowledge (Koriat, 2008) and perceptual 
judgments (Koriat, 2011). An HLM predicted confidence from 
response consensuality (effect coded: −1  =  nonconsensual 
response, 1  =  consensual response), item consensus, and their 
interaction. A main effect of response consensuality, b  =  2.77 
(SE  =  0.28), t(7409)  =  9.88, and p  <  0.0001, indicated that 
participants were more confident when they made the response 
endorsed by the majority of participants (M  =  76.15) than 
when they made the minority response (M  =  72.08). A main 
A
B
FIGURE 2 | Panel (A) presents the likelihood of repeating the Block-1 
response as a function of confidence in that response in Block 1. Indicated 
also is the number of observations in each confidence category. Panel (B) 
presents the same data for response latency.
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effect of item consensus, b  =  0.12 (SE  =  0.03), t(198)  =  3.68, 
and p < 0.001, indicated that confidence increased with increasing 
item consensus. A significant interaction, b = 0.18 (SE = 0.02), 
t(7057)  =  7.71, and p  <  0.0001, indicated that the impact of 
item consensus on confidence differed between consensual and 
nonconsensual responses. Separate HLMs for consensual and 
nonconsensual responses indicated that confidence in consensual 
responses increased with item consensus, b = 0.30 (SE = 0.03), 
t(129)  =  9.02, and p  <  0.0001, whereas confidence in 
nonconsensual responses decreased with item consensus, 
b  =  −0.12 (SE  =  0.05), t(138)  =  2.23, and p  =  0.028.
Response Latency as a Function of Cross-Person 
Consensus
Similar analyses to those of confidence were applied to response 
latency. The results (for Block 1) are presented in Figure  3B. 
The pattern mimics largely the one obtained for confidence.
In an HLM predicting response latency, a main effect of 
consensuality, b  =  −0.19 (SE  =  0.03), t(7167)  =  6.98, and 
p  <  0.0001, indicated that participants responded faster 
(M  =  3.18  s) when they chose the consensual response than 
when they chose the nonconsensual response (M  =  3.60  s). A 
significant interaction, b  =  −0.01 (SE  =  0.002), t(6963)  =  5.08, 
and p  <  0.0001, indicated that the impact of item consensus 
on response latency differed between consensual and nonconsensual 
responses. The main effect of item consensus was not significant, 
t(190) = 0.50, and p = 0.615, and separate HLMs for consensual 
and nonconsensual responses indicated that response latency 
for consensual responses decreased with item consensus, b = −0.01 
(SE  =  0.003), t(132)  =  3.34, and p  =  0.001, whereas that for 
nonconsensual responses increased with item consensus, b = 0.01 
(SE  =  0.01), t(132)  =  2.42, and p  =  0.017.
In sum, despite the idiosyncratic nature of the responses 
to self-descriptive items, the results yielded a PME for both 
confidence and response speed as those found for other tasks.
Comparing the Effects of Response Consensus 
to Those of Response Consistency
We examined the possibility that the effect of consensus was 
relatively weak compared to that of within-person consistency. 
To do so, we  predicted confidence and response latency from 
(a) consensus based on the responses made to an item in 
Block 1 by the remaining 56 participants, (b) consistency 
depending on the item’s within-participant frequency, and (c) 
their interaction. An HLM predicting confidence for Block 1 
from consensus, consistency, and their interaction, yielded a 
main effect for consensus, b  =  0.21 (SE  =  0.03), t(133)  =  7.76, 
and p < 0.0001, as well as for consistency, b = 6.67 (SE = 0.34), 
t(7492)  =  19.64, and p  <  0.0001. The interaction was not 
significant, t(7459)  =  1.43 and p  =  0.152. As suggested by the 
t-values, the effects of response consistency were stronger than 
those of response consensus. Indeed, the standardized regression 
weights amounted to 0.29 for consistency, and only to 0.01 
for consensus. These results suggest that there was only a small 
overlap between the populations of cues from which participants 
sampled the cues underlying their choices and confidence.
We compared these results to those obtained for other 
domains. In a perceptual task that required comparing the 
length of two lines, the impact of response consistency on 
confidence was about the same in magnitude as the impact 
of response consensus (Koriat, 2011). In contrast, confidence 
in personal preferences such as whether one prefers to have 
a dog or a cat or to use a pen or a pencil, was impacted 
more strongly by response consistency than by response consensus 
(Koriat, 2013). These results seem to disclose the relative degree 
of cross-person communality in the populations of cues from 
which people draw their samples in responding to the items 
in each domain: the more idiosyncratic these populations of 
cues are, the weaker the impact of consensus relative to that 
of consistency.
A similar HLM for response latency yielded a main effect 
for consistency, b  =  0.33 (SE  =  0.03), t(7268)  =  9.89, and 
p  <  0.0001, a marginally significant main effect of consensus, 
b  =  0.005 (SE  =  0.002), t(133)  =  1.90, and p  =  0.060, and 
A
B
FIGURE 3 | Mean confidence judgments Panel (A) and response latency 
Panel (B) in Block 1 for consensual and nonconsensual responses as a 
function of item consensus – the percentage of participants who made the 
majority response.
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no interaction, t(7235)  =  0.84 and p  =  0.400. Thus, response 
latency varied with consistency, whereas consensus had only 
a marginal effect.
The Relationship Between Cross-Person 
Consensus and Within-Person Consistency
It may be  expected that participants who exhibit a strong 
impact of self-consistency, suggesting greater reliance on 
idiosyncratic cues, would exhibit weaker impact of cross-
person consensus. To examine this possibility, we  calculated 
two indices for each individual. As an index of within-person 
consistency, we  used the proportion of items for which each 
participant made the same response across all blocks. As 
an index of cross-person consensus, we  used the proportion 
of items for which the participant’s response was the consensual 
response. Unlike what might have been expected, the 
correlation between the two indices was positive and significant, 
r  =  0.46, t(55)  =  3.81, and p  <  0.001. Furthermore, an HLM 
predicting consensus in Block 1 from participants’ confidence 
in their Block-1 choice indicated that participants’ confidence 
predicted the likelihood that the same choice would be made 
by other participants, b  =  0.07 (SE  =  0.01), t(7524)  =  11.80, 
and p  <  0.0001 (see also Koriat, 2019). These results suggest 
that the shared core of cues that contributes to the effects 
of consensus on choice and confidence, also contributes to 
the impact of self-consistency.
The Effects of Consensus for Different 
Personality Scales
So far, we have analyzed the results across all the items included 
in this study, focusing on structural characteristics that follow 
from the sampling assumption underlying the Self-Consistency 
Model. We  now examine how the results hold true across the 
personality scales used in this study.
As noted earlier, two of the scales—SD and FNE—have been 
assumed to correlate with the tendency to yield to conformity 
pressures (e.g., Marlowe and Crowne, 1961; Leary and Kowalski, 
1997). We examined the possibility that the effects of consensus 
on confidence and response speed were mostly due to these 
scales. To do so, we  compared the effects of consensus for the 
SD and FNE scales to those for the NFC and RE scales. Focusing 
on the results for Block 1, an HLM predicted confidence from 
consensus, scale type (effect coded: −1  =  scales NFC and RE, 
1  =  scales SD and FNE), and their interaction. A main effect 
for consensus, b = 0.21 (SE = 0.04), t(131) = 6.03, and p < 0.0001, 
indicated that high consensus generally increased people’s 
confidence in personality items. A main effect of scale type, 
b  =  0.72 (SE  =  0.36), t(131)  =  2.00, and p  =  0.048, indicated 
higher confidence in responses to items that tap a tendency 
to yield to group pressure. Importantly, a non-significant 
interaction, t(131)  =  1.86 and p  =  0.066, indicated that the 
effect of consensus on confidence in personality items was not 
restricted to items that tap a tendency to yield to group pressure.
Response latency yielded a similar pattern of results. An 
HLM predicting latency from consensus, scale type, and their 
interaction, revealed a main effect of consensus, b  =  −0.009 
(SE  =  0.004), t(131)  =  2.44, and p  =  0.016, but no other 
significant effects, t  <  1.
In sum, the effects of cross-participant consensus on confidence 
and response latency were not restricted to items that tap a 
tendency to yield to group pressure. Rather, these effects seem 
to be  relatively independent of the content of the personality 
dimensions used.
DISCUSSION
The question of the consistency in people’s behavior is a central 
question in the study of personality and has important 
implications for personality assessment. Several researchers 
proposed that the notion of traits needs to be  modified to 
incorporate within-person variability. For example, Fleeson 
(2001, 2004; see also Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 2015) argued 
that traits should be  viewed as density distributions that 
represent how a person acts on different occasions. Other 
researchers suggested that inter-person differences in response 
variability are of interest in their own right (Fiske and Rice, 1955; 
Fleeson, 2001).
In this study, we  focused narrowly on the stability and 
variability that can be  observed in responses to items that are 
assumed to measure personality traits. We  assumed that 
examination of the decision processes underlying people’s responses 
could shed light on the stability and variability in their responses. 
In our previous work, we successfully applied the Self-Consistency 
Model to 2AFC questions in different domains (Koriat, 2012; 
Koriat et  al., 2016). Here, we  examined which aspects of the 
model hold true for personality items. In what follows, we  first 
summarize and discuss the results for the within-person analyses. 
We then turn to those concerning cross-person consensus. Finally, 
we  note general implications of the results.
Within-Person Consistency and Variability
The within-person analyses yielded a very similar pattern of 
results to that obtained in other domains, including perceptual 
decisions, social beliefs, social attitudes, personal preferences, 
and category membership decisions (see Koriat et  al., 2016). 
This finding suggests that the process underlying the choice 
of a response to self-descriptive items has much in common 
with that underlying the response to 2AFC items in other 
domains. Specifically, the sampling assumption was found to 
provide insight into the processes that contribute to the 
consistency and variability in the response to personality test 
items. First, the results indicated that individual differences in 
responding to personality items are relatively stable across 
repeated test presentations (see Fleeson, 2004). Second, there 
was some variability in responding to test items across repeated 
presentations. However, frequent responses were endorsed with 
stronger confidence and shorter response latencies than rare 
responses, and the difference in confidence between the two 
types of responses increased with item consistency. Finally, the 
confidence and speed with which the response was made in 
the first presentation of an item predicted the likelihood of 
repeating that response in subsequent presentations of the item.
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Taken together, the results are consistent with the idea 
that responses to self-descriptive items are not retrieved ready-
made from memory but are constructed online at the time 
of responding to the items. Online construction is assumed 
to entail the sampling of a small number of cues from the 
larger population of cues associated with the item. Across 
occasions, people sample their cues from the same population 
of cues, resulting in generally consistent responses across 
repeated item presentations. However, the samples may differ 
because of random factors or differences in context or mood, 
resulting in some variability across occasions. As a result, in 
a minority of occasions, participants may opt for a response 
that departs from their own typical response, but their confidence 
in that response will be  relatively low. Thus, the confidence 
and speed with which a response is endorsed capture both 
the stable, replicable components of the decision, and the 
variability that can ensue from the sampling process.
These results have implications for test construction. They 
suggest that the confidence and response speed with which 
responses are made can help item selection when the goal is 
to increase the test-retest reliability of the scale as a whole. 
Of course, exclusive selection of items associated with high 
confidence and speed may not be  functional when the interest 
is also to track individual differences in response consistency 
and variability (see below).
The Impact of Cross-Person Consensus
Turning next to the results for cross-participant consensus, 
these results were somewhat surprising. Despite the idiosyncratic 
nature of the responses to personality items, people responded 
relatively faster and more confidently when endorsing the 
response given by the majority of participants. Confidence also 
yielded the typical PME: the difference between consensual 
and nonconsensual responses increased with increasing 
item consensus.
Possibly, despite the idiosyncratic nature of personality 
measures, test items tend to elicit cues that overlap across 
participants. As noted earlier, in a study of social attitudes 
(Koriat and Adiv, 2011) that used items measuring conservatism-
liberalism views, a PME emerged for both “conservatives” and 
“liberals” even when the responses were classified as majority 
or minority on the basis of the entire sample of participants. 
In addition, cues differ in the ease with which they come to 
mind. Indeed, results suggest that differences in the familiarity 
and accessibility of cues have systematic effects on confidence 
independent of the content of these cues (Koriat, 2008).
However, the impact of consensus on confidence and response 
speed was much more limited than that of response consistency, 
suggesting that the populations of cues underlying personality-
related items are largely idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, the results 
suggest a shared core of cues that underlies the response to 
personality test items, and this core impacts the confidence 
and response speed with which that response is endorsed.
Some General Implications
What are the general implications of the results of this study? 
The Self-Consistency Model was initially applied to tasks for 
which the binary response has a truth value: general knowledge 
and perceptual judgments. In these tasks, the confidence in 
the response conveys the person’s degree of conviction that 
the answer chosen is the correct answer. However, what is the 
meaning of subjective confidence in the context of such tasks 
as social attitudes, personal preferences, or category-membership 
judgments, for which the response does not have a truth value? 
Koriat (2012, 2018) argued that in all of these domains, including 
those for which the response has a truth value, subjective 
confidence actually monitors the reliability of the response: it 
represents an assessment of the likelihood that a new sample 
of cues drawn from the same population will support the 
same response.
The results of the present study suggest that this is also 
the meaning of subjective confidence in the response to a 
personality statement: it reflects the assessment that the response 
is “reliable.” What is notable is that across several domains, 
confidence and response latency were found indeed to predict 
the replicability of the response (see Koriat et  al., 2016), and 
this was also true for the personality items used in this study. 
Thus, both repeated testing and confidence judgments can help 
identify the stable, replicable components in people’s responses 
to personality tests.
Whereas the focus of this study was on confidence in the 
response to a particular item, research suggests that overall 
confidence in the responses to a particular scale is also 
diagnostic of the reliability of the of scale score. Shoots-
Reinhard et  al. (2015) used several individual-differences 
measures that are related to political behavior. They found 
that people who endorsed their responses with overall higher 
confidence evidenced higher stability in their scores over time. 
Test scores associated with higher confidence were also more 
predictive of political outcomes than those associated with 
lower confidence.
It is of interest to relate our results to the idea of the 
wisdom of the inner crowd (Vul and Pashler, 2008; Herzog 
and Hertwig, 2009, 2014; Hourihan and Benjamin, 2010; 
Litvinova, 2020). This idea was applied to tasks for which the 
response has a truth-value. For these tasks, it was found that 
when a person provides several judgments, the aggregated 
judgment tends to be  closer to the truth than any of the 
individual judgments. According to the Self-Consistency Model 
(Koriat, 2018), this is because in many domains, the reliable 
judgment is also the correct judgment. In general, however, 
the aggregation of individual responses across different occasions 
provides a clue to the central tendency of the population of 
cues from which the person samples the cues in each occasion. 
It is this tendency that is responsible for the consistency of 
responses across occasions.
Indeed, several researchers have called for a repeated 
assessment of personality across different occasions. As noted 
earlier, Fleeson (2001, 2004; see also Fleeson and Jayawickreme, 
2015) proposed to view traits as density distributions. These 
distributions can be  measured by the frequency with which 
a particular trait is expressed in different occasions (see also 
Sun and Vazire, 2019). It may be  argued that the sampling 
of cues assumed to underlie test-takers’ responses to personality 
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items constitutes in part a mental simulation of the procedure 
used by Fleeson (2004) and Sun and Vazire (2019). For example, 
in responding to the item “Do you  have difficulty controlling 
your feelings,” respondents might scan their memory for relevant 
personal episodes in deciding between yes and no. If so, 
confidence judgments may provide a rough estimate of the 
variability that would be  expected across different occasions. 
Clearly, however, more research is needed to examine whether 
the confidence and response latency obtained in a single 
administration of test items can capture part of the consistency 
and variability with which people express trait-related behavior 
under real-life conditions.
Another question concerns the proposal that within-person 
variability constitutes a stable dimension of individual differences 
that is worthy of investigation in its own right (Fiske and 
Rice, 1955; Fleeson, 2001; Baird et  al., 2006; Ferrando, 2011). 
This proposal was made in particular in connection of the 
notion of Self-Concept Clarity (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 
1990; DeMarree and Bobrowski, 2018). As noted earlier, Markus 
(1977) argued that a well-articulated self-schema is essential 
for consistency in endorsements of personality items. It is of 
interest to examine whether the methodology used in the 
present study can be  applied to examine the possibility of 
reliable individual differences in the consistency and clarity 
of self-descriptions.
Finally, our results suggest differences between domains in 
the relative impact of consensus versus consistency. It might 
be  interesting to examine whether there are also reliable 
individual differences in this respect. Although the impact of 
consensus and that of consistency were found to correlate 
positively across participants, differences between individuals 
may also convey information about the extent to which the 
cues underlying a person’s responses to personality and self-
concept questions are idiosyncratic.
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